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PATENT PROTECTION OF COMPUTER
SOFTWARE-PRACTICAL INSIGHTS
James A. Sheridan
Whether or not computer software is patentable has been
one of the most controversial issues in intellectual property
protection over the last twenty years. It now appears that the
United States Patent Office will grant patents on some
software.' This article examines the issue of patentability of
computer software and some of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of patent protection.
It is important to remember that there are several facets
to the question of whether computer software is patentable.
This discussion is concerned only with the issue of whether
computer software is "patentable subject matter" under the
patent laws." However, in addition to being proper subject
matter, the subject of a patent claim must also be shown to be
news and unobvious.4 The patent laws further impose the re-
quirement that the invention be adequately disclosed so that
anyone else working in the same field of technology could
reproduce the claimed invention."
The distinction between what is patentable and what is
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. section 101 was drawn by the
United States Supreme Court over 100 years ago. In O'Reilly
v. Morse6 the Court stated:
The mere discovery of a new element, or law, or principle
of nature without any valuable application of it to the
arts, is not the subject of a patent. But he who takes this
new element or power, as yet useless, from the laboratory
© 1983 by James A. Sheridan
1. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, § 2110 (1983).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). § 101 provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the condi-
tions and requirements of this title."
3. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
6. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 131 (1853) (Grier, J., dissenting).
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of the philosopher, and makes it the servant of man; who
applies it to the perfecting of a new and useful art, or to
the improvement to one already known is the benefactor
to whom the patent law tenders its protection."
In the context of a discussion of computer software, the
issue raised in O'Reilly is whether a computer program which
performs an algorithm' is the proper subject of a patent. The
Supreme Court has finally recognized that when an algorithm
does more than represent a scientific principle or law of na-
ture and instead becomes a vehicle for communicating a solu-
tion to a complex problem in a particular environment, then
its use can be the basis for patent protection."
Relatively few cases have been decided by the federal dis-
trict courts on the patentability of computer software.10 In ex-
amining those cases that have been decided, it is significant
that in the Patent Office the final court of review has always
been almost exclusively the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals (CCPA)." This court has consistently maintained that
no basis exists for treating a computer implemented process
differently from a process performed by any other machine
system when the issue of statutory subject matter is consid-
ered. The CCPA has focused its inquiry only on whether a
claim reciting or covering a software implemented process is
attempting to wholly preempt the use of the algorithm or is
intended to cover only a method of calculation in a given
environment. 2
The significance of the CCPA's consistent viewpoint is
that in 1982 it became part of the Court of Appeals of the
7. Id. at 132.
8. An algorithm is a step-by-step procedure for solving a problem. WFBSTERS
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 28 (1979).
9. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). The Court stated: "When a claim
containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure
or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the
patent laws were designed to protect ... then the claim satisfies the requirements [of
patent law]." Id. at 192.
10. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338, the federal district courts have exclusive juris-
diction over patent cases.
11. Appeal to the CCPA is pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1976). The other
choice, rarely used, is a trial de novo in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia. This is not a true appeal, but a civil action to obtain a patent. 35 U.S.C. §
145 (1976).
12. Application of Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), modified on reh'g, 415
F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
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Federal Circuit. It now has exclusive jurisdiction in all appeals
from the federal district courts of all cases related to the va-
lidity and infringement of patents. 13 Therefore, in a proceed-
ing to enforce a patent granted on computer software, an ap-
peal must be taken to the CCPA. Based on the history of
CCPA decisions over the last ten years, this court will almost
certainly have a strongly favorable view toward upholding
patents based on computer software, provided that the
software is properly disclosed and claimed.
The CCPA's approach constitutes a considerable change
from the Supreme Court's attitude of the early 1970s. At that
time it was generally believed that software implemented or
algorithm based inventions were unpatentable. The Supreme
Court first examined the issue of patenting complete software
in Gottschalk v. Benson 4 which involved a method for con-
verting from binary coded decimal numbers into pure binary
numbers within a computer.' 5 The claim, as written, would
have wholly preempted the use of this algorithm within any
computer, and the Court held that the claim to this formula
was akin to the recitation of a law of nature. The court stated
correctly that: "The formula involved here has no practical
application except in connection with the digital computer,
which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the pat-
ent would wholly preempt the mathematical formula and a
practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm.""6
The Court further stated that the patentability of com-
puter software was a matter for congressional legislation and
that the Court should not attempt to intervene in the
matter.' 7
In fact, a Presidential Commission formed in 1965 had
recommended against patent protection for computer pro-
grams.' 8 Legislation to that effect was proposed in 1967; how-
ever, because of considerable opposition, it was withdrawn
and never reintroduced. 9
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1982).
14. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
15. The purpose of this program was to convert telephone numbers into binary
form which was necessary for telephone interconnection. Id.
16. 409 U.S. at 71.
17. Id. at 73.
18. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM (1966).
19. H.R. 5924, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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The Supreme Court next addressed the issue of the pat-
entability of software in Parker v. Flook.20 The claim in
Parker described a method of updating alarm limits. A math-
ematical algorithm was used to compute the value of environ-
mental limits in a catalytic hydrocarbon conversion process.
In essence, the method consisted of three steps: (1) a step of
measuring the present value of selective process variables
(temperature); (2) an intermediate step which used the al-
gorithm to calculate an updated alarm limit value; and (3) a
final step in which the actual alarm limit is adjusted to the
updated value.21
The Supreme Court found the software program unpat-
entable. The Court stated that this case must be considered as
if the principle, the formula for calculating the updated alarm
limits, was well known and that the plaintiff had first in-
vented a mode of applying it. However, since the plaintiff did
not even describe any specific mode of applying the calcula-
tion, there was no patentable subject matter.2 2 Therefore, this
application of Flook was essentially attempting to preempt a
method of calculating without providing any supporting con-
nection to a real-world environment.
Finally, in 1981 the Supreme Court in Diamond v.
Diehr 2 8 allowed a patent in which the novel features clearly
resided in the calculating algorithm, but the algorithm was
disclosed and claimed in a real-world operating environment.
The invention in Diehr involved the process of constantly
measuring the actual temperature inside a rubber curing mold
using a known equation. The temperatures were then fed into
a computer which repeatedly recalculated the cure time by
use of the same equation. At the appropriate time, the com-
puter would signal a device to open the press.
20. 437 U.S. 584 -(1978).
21. Id. at 585.
22. The Court stated:
The patent application does not purport to explain how to select the
appropriate margin of safety, the weighting factor or any of the other
variables of the equation. Nor does it purport to contain any disclosure
relating to the chemical processes at work, the monitoring of process
variables, or the means of setting off an alarm or adjusting an alarm
system. All that it provides is a formula for computing an updated alarm
limit.
437 U.S. at 586.
23. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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The applicants contended that the processes involved in
the continuous measuring of the temperature inside the mold
cavity, the feeding of this information to a digital computer
which constantly recalculated the cure time, and the signaling
by the computer to open the press were all new in the art.2 4
The Court held that the equation itself was not patentable, in
isolation, but when the process for curing rubber was devised
which incorporates this equation in a more efficient manner,
that process is not barred from patentability by section 101.25
It is worth noting that the decision in the Diehr case was
the third pro-patent decision of the Supreme Court in less
than one year.2 Prior to 1981 the Supreme Court had not up-
held a single patent since United States v. Adams27 which
was decided in 1966. Throughout the intervening time the
Court, in striking down patents, had repeatedly stressed the
"nation's deep seated antipathy to monopolies. 2 8 In the cases
decided in 1981, the opinions discussed the positive factors of
encouraging invention and research and development which
result from the patent system.2 9
It is further worth noting that thanks to Apple Computer,
Inc., Atari, Inc., and similarly situated companies, the com-
puter had moved from the laboratory and university and into
the homes of people throughout the country, making com-
puter innovation and invention a much less awesome subject
with which to contend.
Diehr limited the scope of the previous decisions in Gott-
schalk and FlookA0 Now, only those claims which recite a
mathematical formula in the abstract appear to be excluded
24. Id. at 179.
25. Id. at 184.
26. See Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303 (1980).
27. 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
28. See, e.g., Deep South Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530-31
(1972); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1966).
29. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 307.
30. 450 U.S. at 185-87. However, the similarities between what was disclosed
and claimed in Diehr and what was claimed in the Flook case decided four years
earlier are remarkable. It would appear that the only reasonable rationale for the
different results in the two cases is the lack of a close relationship in Flook between
the claimed calculation and the process to be controlled. That is, Flook did not claim
steps of terminating or adjusting the process of catalytic conversion, nor did the claim
specifically describe the process which was to be controlled or the interaction between
process and monitoring computer.
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from patent protection."1
While the Supreme Court was agonizing over the basic is-
sue of the patentability of software, the CCPA, whose deci-
sions consistently favored patentability, was developing a two-
step test for analyzing whether a claim involving computer
programming or an algorithm constitutes potentially patenta-
ble subject matter under 35 U.S.C. section 101.32 As a first
step, each claim must be analyzed to determine whether an
algorithm is either directly or indirectly recited. Thus, even if
the claim at issue does not directly recite a mathematical al-
gorithm or calculation, reference will be made to the patent
application specification to determine whether the claim lan-
guage is intended to cover a mathematical calculation,
formula or equation. Only if the answer to this first question
is yes must the second step of the test be taken.
The second step is to determine whether the claim would
preempt the algorithm's use by anyone for any purpose. If so,
the claim will be held unstatutory under 35 U.S.C. section
101. However, if the claim recites a calculation which is immi-
nently related to the environment in which the invention is
used and controls a process or transforms an article, it should
be protectable by patent.
A threshold question which might be considered is
whether there is significant use of the results of the mathe-
matical calculation, such as in Diehr where the result of the
calculation was used to actually open the press in which the
rubber was being formed, or whether the calculations merely
involve one set of numbers being computed from a different
set of numbers by means of a mathematical computation.8
Some of the recent cases decided by the CCPA provide
examples of the application of this two-part test. In In re
Toma3 4 the CCPA examined a claimed method of utilizing a
digital computer for translation from a source natural lan-
guage to a target natural language (from Russian to English,
for example). The method involved three phases: (1) a dic-
tionary lookup phase to establish the target language meaning
31. 450 U.S. at 191. Moreover, the Court notes that "insignificant postsolution
activity will not transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process." Id.
at 191-92.
32. In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
33. In re Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32 (1979).
34. 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
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of each word in the source test; (2) a syntactical analysis for
identifying information from the inflection of the word and
position of the word in the source; and (3) a synthesis phase
for taking the information thus generated and forming a sen-
tence in the target language. Although the method clearly
used information stored in a digital computer, an analysis of
these three steps does not disclose any use of equations to
perform the claimed steps of the method and, thus, the first
step of the two-part test has not been met. Therefore, one
need proceed no further in concluding that this covers statu-
tory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. section 101.
In re Pardo5 provides another example of a patent claim
where the first question of the two-part test was answered
negatively and ultimately a patent was granted. The invention
involved a method for automatically rearranging random for-
mulae for sequential execution by a computer. Such rear-
rangement was necessary where a user provided formulae to a
computer in an order which could not be executed because
one step presented early in a sequence could not be performed
until the results of later steps were attained. The invention
was designed to rearrange the order of the formulae as
presented to the computer by the user so that the computer
could execute the operations. The CCPA held that the inven-
tion did not recite a mathematical formula, calculation or al-
gorithm. The fact that a computer controlled according to the
invention was capable of handling mathematics was irrelevant
to the question of whether a mathematical algorithm was re-
cited by the claims. Accordingly, the court held that the
claims met the test for statutory subject matter.
In re Sarker" and In re Gelnovatch37 provide models of
inventions which were not deemed patentable under the two-
part test. Both of these cases related solely to the use of
mathematical models for design simulation functions. In
Sarker the invention was a model for designing ship channels
or the like. In Gelnovatch the model was for an optimal de-
sign process for the design of microwave circuits. In both cases
purely mathematical functions were being carried out on in-
put numbers which were modified to optimize the output of
35. 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
36. 588 F.2d 1330 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
37. 595 F.2d 32 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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the mathematical models. As such, the process as carried out
did not operate on any real numbers tied to a defined real
environment. The claims in both cases were found to be
mathematical formulae under step one and, because under
step two they wholly preempted the use of the underlying al-
gorithms, they were not patentable.
In In re Johnson8 three related patent applications di-
rected to methods for removing undesired noise from seismic
data were considered.3 The CCPA held that each of the three
inventions met the first step of the test in that the claims cov-
ered a calculation, formula or equation for reducing noise or
enhancing digital data. However, the claims also were found
to cover a process which produced a new product comprising
new noiseless seismic traces recorded on a record medium,
rather than mere mathematical values. This decision has two
significant aspects: (1) the process did not operate on a physi-
cal entity as such, but on a recording of electronic signals; and
(2) the output was not the control of a process, but rather a
recording on a physical medium. Nevertheless, because the
process was operated on a set of real values to produce en-
hanced signal recordings in a new and not obvious way (even
though old mathematical equations were used) the process
was held to constitute patentable subject matter.
In re Abele40 is of interest because it furnishes an exam-
ple of how the manner in which claims are drafted may affect
whether a patent is granted. The claims were directed to a
method of analyzing the data in a computerized axial tomog-
raphy (CAT) scanner. The method calculated the data and
displayed results. A claim which recited nothing more than
the steps involved in the calculation and display of data was
found to comprise nonstatutory subject matter under the two-
38. 589 F.2d 1070 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
39.
In seismic processing an acoustic or seismic wave energy source is posi-
tioned on the surface of the earth and an acoustic energy impulse is
generated. The secondary waves which reflect from different layers in
the surface in the earth are recorded and stored in digital form. These
waves are then analyzed to disclose the location of subterranean earth
Itructures. The invention in each of the three applications in these ap-
peals dealt with the removal of unwanted seismic components or noise
present in the recorded seismic data.
589 F.2d at 1071.
40. 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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part test-the claims covered a method of mathematical cal-
culation and wholly preempted the use of the calculating al-
gorithm."' However, a second claim differed in that it recited
that the calculations were performed on data which had
passed through the body of a person under examination by
the scanner. This claim was deemed to recite patentable sub-
ject matter and did not preempt the use of the underlying al-
gorithm from all use, but rather only preempted its use in a
specific environment, that of CAT scanners.42
As the foregoing discussion indicates, guidelines now exist
to determine whether a claim consists of patentable subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. section 101. In deciding whether to
file for patent protection, one must weigh the broad scope of
protection afforded by patent against the time needed to issue
a patent and the need for full disclosure to the public.
Time could be a key factor in deciding whether or not to
apply for a patent. Patents take three to five years to issue. If
the software is expected to be of a relatively short life, patent
protection is probably not worthwhile. However, if the under-
lying algorithm of the software is expected to remain valuable
for a number of years, patent protection may be worthwhile.
This is especially true if the application or operating systems
will undergo modification with time, while the basic functions
of the software implemented system remain the same.
The second key factor is the necessity of making an ade-
quate disclosure to support the application. Under 35 U.S.C.
section 112, the disclosure must be adequate to inform one
skilled in the art how to make and use the invention without
undue experimentation." It is generally conceded that to sup-
port a sufficient disclosure, at least a block diagram of the
complete system and a flow chart of the software to be uti-
41. Id. at 908.
42. Id.
43. 35 U.S.C. § 112 provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particu-
larly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
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lized must be provided." Thus, an applicant must consider
whether, if only a flow chart of the system is provided, an in-
ordinate amount of time would be required to generate the
computer software. If the software could only be duplicated
by a person of unusual skill in computer programming, and
would require an inordinate period of time for debugging in
order to make it work properly, then additional information,
such as the software source or object code must be disclosed.46
Although this disclosure requirement seems to weigh
heavily against applying for a patent, it should be
remembered that a patent remains secret until it is issued.
Therefore, patent protection is not incompatible with trade
secret protection at least for the first three to four years of the
use of the software. Only when it is time for the patent to
issue must the decision be made on whether patent protection
or trade secret protection affords the best hope of maintaining
competitive advantage. Further, although the patent laws re-
quire that on the date a patent application is filed the best
known embodiment of the software be disclosed, that embodi-
ment need not be updated while the patent application is
pending. Therefore, as long as a working embodiment is sup-
plied to the Patent Office at the time the case is filed, the
improvements which may be incorporated in software between
the time the application is filed and the time it issues need
not be disclosed in the issued patent.
Given the two considerations of time and necessity of ad-
equate disclosure, it might appear that the use of patent as a
means of protection has some serious drawbacks. The primary
advantage of patent protection lies in its broad scope. The
scope of protection afforded by patent is probably broader
than that afforded by either copyright or trade secret. Patent
protects an exclusive right to use or license, whereas copyright
only protects an exclusive right to copy, and trade secret only
protects an exclusive right to use. Moreover, the cost of main-
taining protection is almost nil, a factor which is not true of
44. See In re Ghiron, 442 F.2d 985 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
45. Whether the disclosure requires a disclosure of source code or object code is
still an open question. The disclosure of object code, together with a definition of the
specific type of processor for which the software is written, would certainly allow a
person of skill in the computer arts to duplicate the invention. This conclusion would
allow the person who seeks a patent to avoid disclosure of the source code.
[Vol. 23998
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copyright or trade secret. 6 And, in practice, reverse engineer-
ing of a product on the market is not a successful means of
avoiding a patent, as it may be with either copyright or trade
secret.
In conclusion, the protection of computer software con-
tinues to pose many challenging questions. The Supreme
Court's decision in Diamond v. Diehr appears to have re-
solved the question of patentability of software. And the Free-
man test adopted by the CCPA offers a consistent standard
by which patent claims can be measured. Consequently, pat-
ent has become an increasingly viable means of protecting this
form of intellectual property. This presents a challenge for the
practitioner. He must be prepared to consider all of the tradi-
tional means available for the protection of ideas-copyright,
trade secret, patent and contractual arrangements-and de-
termine which best suits his client's needs.
While patent protection has its limitations, it appears to
be very well suited for the protection of computer software
due to the exclusive rights it encompasses. Patent has the
added advantage of allowing inventors to reap the rewards of
their ideas while benefiting society by the dissemination of
those same ideas.
46. A discussion of the differences between patent, trademark and copyright
protection is beyond the scope of this article. However, see Appendix A for a general
overview of the differing characteristics of these forms of protection for intellectual
property. Appendix A was adapted from Reiling and Lester, Marketing Software
Products, 8 ALPA Q.J. 294, 298, 300 (1980).
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Appendix A
COMPARISON OF LEGAL FORMS OF PROTECTION
CONSIDERATION
NationalIlnifnrmitv
COPYRIGHT
Yes
TRADE SECRET PATENT
Protected Fixed expres- Ideas and exp- Invention
Interest sions of author ressions
Scope of Exclusive right Exclusive Broadest, ex-
Protection to reproduce, right to use cludes others
prepare deriva- from making,
tive works, pub- using, selling
licly display
and publicly
perform.
Effective Date Fixation of work Use in Busi- Issue of patent
of Protection in sufficiently ness provided successful pro-
permanent and that subject secution of pat-
tangible form matter is ent application
guarded from
public dis-
closure.
Cost of Obtain- Small Moderate Moderate
ing Protection
Term of Life of author Possibility of 17 years
Protection plus 50 years both perceptual
or 75 years protection and
termination at
any time
Cost of main- Small Significant Nil
taining protec-
tion
Cost of Enforcing Moderate High High
Rights against
violators
Protection Gross neglect Public Dis- Unsuccessful
Lost by- closure validity or
misuse litiga-
tion
Internationally Often Not generally Often, but
foreign filing
may disclose
before U.S.
rights per-
fected
Execution of No Yes Yes
Software
Products
Protectable
Suited to wide- Yes No Yes
scale distribu-
tion
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